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SIMILARITY, PRECEDENT AND ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY 
 
Douglas Walton     CRRAR      University of Windsor 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, it is shown (1) that there are two schemes for argument from analogy that seem 
to be competitors but are not, (2) how one of them is based on a distinctive type of similarity 
premise, (3) how to analyze the notion of similarity using story schemes illustrated by some 
cases, (4) how arguments from precedent are based on arguments from analogy, and in many 
instances arguments from classification, and (5) that when similarity is defined by means of 
story schemes, we can get a clearer idea of how it integrates with the use of argument from 
classification and argument from precedent in case-based reasoning by using a dialogue 
structure.   
 
Key words: stories; case-based reasoning; argument from classification; argumentation. 
 
 
     This paper is about the logical structure of argument from analogy and its relationship to 
legal arguments from classification and precedent. Its main purpose is to provide guidance for 
researchers in AI and law on which argumentation scheme for argument from analogy to use, 
among the leading candidates that are currently available. Arguments from precedent cases to 
a case at issue are based on underlying arguments from analogy of a kind extremely common 
both in everyday conversational argumentation and in legal reasoning. There is a very large 
literature on argument from analogy in argumentation (Guarini et al., 2009), and the topic is 
fundamentally important for law because of the centrality of arguments from precedent and 
analogy in Anglo-American law. It is not hard to appreciate this connection, given that 
according the rule of stare decisis, the precedent decision of a higher or equal court is binding 
on a similar current case (Ashley, 1988, 206). 
     In this paper, cases are used to argue that arguments from precedent are based on 
arguments from analogy in legal reasoning, and that arguments from analogy are based on a 
similarity between the two cases held to be analogous. As shown in the paper, this claim is 
controversial, because there are different views about how the argumentation scheme for 
argument from analogy should be formulated (Macagno and Walton, 2009). According to the 
version of the scheme for argument from analogy argued to be the basic one in this paper, one 
of the premises has a requirement holding that there is a similarity between the two cases in 
point. In this paper I show how to analyze this notion of similarity using the story-based 
approach of Bex (2009) and the formal dialogue model for investigating stories of Bex and 
Prakken (2010). It is shown how an abstract structure called a story scheme can be employed in 
a way that makes it useful to identify, analyze and evaluate arguments from analogy, and show 
their function in case-based reasoning where precedents are involved.  
     In Popov v Hayashi (Popov v. Hayashi 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Superior, Dec. 18, 2002)), 
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a case that has become a benchmark in AI and law (Gordon and Walton, 2006a; Wyner, Bench-
Capon and Atkinson, 2007), the issue concerned which fan had ownership rights to a home run 
baseball hit into the stands by Barry Bonds while the precedent cases concerned the hunting 
and fishing of wild animals. A problem posed is that the baseball case and the animals cases 
don’t seem all that similar to each other at first sight, even though it can be argued that they 
are similar (or not) in certain respects. The problem is to specify exactly how they are similar, or 
are supposed to be, in an argument from a precedent case to a case being decided, when the 
relationship between the two cases is thought to be one of similarity. Ashley (2009, 1), referring 
to one of the animals cases, posed the problem in the question: “How is Barry Bonds’ 73rd 
home run like a fox in a fox hunt?” The problem is to clearly define similarity in such a way that 
it can identified as being claimed to hold in a pair of cases, so that it can used as a premise in an 
argument from analogy.  This problem is not so easy to solve as it may initially appear to be, for 
as Ashley (2009, 1) observed, in legal argument from analogy it is often necessary to interpret 
similarity and difference at multiple levels. 
 
1. The Wild Animals Cases and the Baseball Case 
 
     In the case of Popov v Hayashi, a valuable home run ball was hit into the stands by Barry 
Bonds in 2001, and a dispute arose concerning which fan had ownership rights to it. In the trial, 
the reasoning partly turned on some precedent cases that concerned the hunting and fishing of 
wild animals. Much has been written in the literature on AI and law, on its relationship to these 
other cases and how case-based reasoning can evaluate the argumentation in them using 
factors and dimensions in analogous cases (Bench-Capon, 2009, 2010). 
     The following account of the facts of the baseball case has been summarized from the 
statement of decision of the judge, Kevin M. McCarthy (McCarthy, 2002). Barry Bonds hit his 
record-breaking 73rd home run in 2001 at PacBell Park in San Francisco. The ball would be very 
valuable. Mark McGwire’s 70th home run ball hit in 1998 sold for $3 million. The ball went into 
the stands and landed in the upper portion of the webbing of a glove worn by a fan, Alex 
Popov. The glove stopped the trajectory of the ball, but the ball did not go fully into the mitt. 
The partial catch did not give certainty of obtaining control of the ball, since Popov had to reach 
for it and may have lost his balance while doing this. Just as it entered his glove, he was thrown 
to the ground by a mob of fans who were also trying to get the ball. Buried face down on the 
ground under several layers of people, he was grabbed, hit and kicked. Somebody in the crowd 
videotaped the incident. Another fan standing nearby, Patrick Hayashi, picked up the loose ball 
and put it in his pocket. When the man making the videotape pointed the camera at Hayashi, 
he held the ball in the air for the others to see. Hayashi was not part of the mob that had 
knocked Popov down, and was not at fault for the assault on Popov.  
     According to a tacit code of conduct concerning baseball fans’ understanding of first 
possession of baseballs (Grey, 2002, 6), a fan who catches a ball that leaves the field of play has 
the right to keep the baseball. However a fan who tries to catch such a ball but does not 
complete the catch, has no rights to the baseball. The catch only occurs when the fan has the 
ball in his hands or glove and the ball remains there after its momentum has ceased, and after 
the fan makes contact with a railing, a wall, the ground, or other fans who are trying to catch it. 
If no one catches the baseball, another fan may pick it up and thereby becomes the owner of it. 
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According to these rules, it looks like Hayashi has the right to ownership of the ball, but Popov 
took the case to court to contest this claim.  
     The fundamental disagreement in the trial in the Superior Court of California City and County 
of San Francisco, was about the definition of possession (MCarthy, 2002, 5). In order to aid the 
court, Judge McCarthy asked four distinguished law professors to participate in a forum to 
discuss the legal definition of possession. The professors disagreed, and Judge McCarthy 
admitted that although the term ‘possession’ appears throughout the law, its definition varies, 
depending on the context in which it is used. The task of the court was taken to be to craft a 
definition of ‘possession’ that applies to the circumstances of the case (MCarthy. 2002, 6). 
Professor Brian T. Gray was one of the legal experts asked to provide advice, and Judge 
McCarthy adopted as his central tenet what he called Gray’s Rule, the rule that to have 
possession of the ball, the actor must retain control of it after incidental contact with people 
and things (MCarthy, 2002, 8). Judge McCarthy (2002, 9) ruled that although Popov did not 
retain control of the ball, other factors need to be considered. One is that his efforts to retain 
control were interrupted by a violent mob of wrongdoers. Another is the principle that if an 
actor takes steps to achieve possession of a piece of abandoned property, but is interrupted by 
the actions of others, he has a pre-possessory interest in the property. After examining all the 
arguments, Judge McCarthy decided that any award to one party would be unfair to the other, 
and that each had an equal and undivided interest in the ball.  
     During their testimony, the law professors pointed out several precedent cases where there 
was pursuit of an animal that the pursuer failed to catch because somebody or something 
intervened, and the issue was whether the pursuer could claim possession of the animal. In 
Pierson v. Post (3Cai. R. 175; 1805 N.Y. LEXIS 311), Pierson was out with hounds chasing a fox 
when Post captured and killed the fox, even though he knew it was being pursued. The court 
decided in favor of Post on the grounds that mere pursuit did not give Pierson a right to the fox 
as his property. In Young v. Hitchens (6 Q.B.606 (1844)), Young was a commercial fisherman 
who spread his net, and when it was almost closed, Hitchens went through the gap and caught 
the fish with his own net. The court found for Hitchens. In Keeble v. Hickeringill, ((1707) 103 ER 
1127), P owned a pond and made his living by luring wild ducks there with decoys, shooting 
them, and selling them for food. Out of malice, D used guns to scare the ducks away from the 
pond. In this case P won. In Ghen v. Rich (8 F.159 D. Mass, 1881), Ghen harpooned a whale 
from his ship and it was washed ashore. It was found by another man, who sold it to Rich. 
According to custom, the man who found the whale should have reported it to Ghen and 
collected a fee. The court found for Ghen. Gray (2002) cited a number of comparable cases 
from whaling where possession was defined by taking the accepted customs and practices of 
the whalers into account.  
     What makes these wild animals cases work as precedents that can be taken into account in 
the Popov case, and suggest a conclusion that ought to be drawn favoring one side or the 
other? An obvious and widely accepted answer is that the animals cases are similar to the 
Popov case. But what does this answer amount to? On the surface, the cases are not similar. 
Grey (2002, 1) made the point that catching a baseball is not similar to mortally wounding a fox 
or harpooning a whale: “a baseball at the end of its arc of descent is not at all like a fox racing 
across the commons, acting under its own volition, desperately attempting to evade death at 
the hands of its pursuers”. At first sight, the two kinds of cases do not appear to be similar. 
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They are about very different activities. Evidently, the similarity is only that they are both about 
one party trying to catch and possess something, and about interference by another party who 
also seeks possession of the same thing in a way that might prevent another from obtaining 
possession. That’s not what we normally think about when we say that two things are similar. 
We think of them sharing a lot of common properties of a visible kind so that they look similar. 
In law, however, features such as intentionality may need to taken into account.   
 
2. Arguments from Analogy and Precedent in Law 
 
     The literature on argument from analogy in fields spanning logic, argumentation studies, 
computer science and law, is enormous. Many proposals have been put forward to represent 
argument from analogy as a form of reasoning or argumentation scheme, and there is no space 
to try to summarize them here. We can only refer the reader to the summary of some of the 
leading theories in (Macagno and Walton, 1994) and the multi-disciplinary bibliography of 
Guarini et al. (2009). Instead, we concentrate on two particular proposals to represent the 
structure of this argumentation scheme that provide a useful contrast to focus the discussion. 
     The simplest argumentation scheme for argument from analogy can be represented by this 
first version from (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 315).  
 
Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
Base Premise: A is true (false) in case C1. 
Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2. 
 
Let’s call this scheme the basic scheme for argument from analogy. The assumption behind the 
basic scheme for argument from analogy is that similarity between two cases where A holds in 
the one case can shift a weight of evidence to make plausible the claim that A also holds in the 
other case. This kind of argument is defeasible, and it can in some instances even be misleading 
and fallacious, as the traditions of informal fallacies warn us (Hamblin, 1970). But how can 
similarity be defined or measured? It seems at first that it can be defined in visual terms as an 
overall appearance of likeness perceived between two cases. It is an important kind of 
argument to study, because so much of our reasoning is based on it (Schauer, 2009). This kind 
of similarity is so striking in some instances, at least at first impression, that it makes the person 
to whom the argument is directed ignore other relevant evidence. 
     It doesn’t seem to be this type of argument from analogy, however, that is being employed 
in the arguments from precedent from the animals cases to the baseball case. For, as 
mentioned above, the case of a fox hunt does not seem to be similar to the case of a baseball 
game in this sense. Nor does the case of harpooning a whale seem to be similar to the baseball 
case in this sense. Trying to catch something is a similarity, but this is only one element that ties 
these cases together as precedents. If you look at the overall pattern recognition type of 
similarity of the baseball case and the harpooning case, they are not visibly similar at all. They 
are only similar in some respects. This observation suggests we look at another version of the 
scheme for argument from analogy. 
          Guarini (2004) has presented a scheme for argument from analogy that he calls the core 
scheme (Guarini, 2004, p. 161). a and b are individual objects. 
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Premise 1: a has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Premise 2: b has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Conclusion: a and b should be treated or classified in the same way with respect to f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
 
The core scheme fits the arguments from analogy between the animals cases and the baseball 
case on the basis that the two premises imply that the pair of cases at issue are similar in 
certain significant respects. A good feature of the core scheme is that it allows the overall 
dissimilarities between pairs of cases to be overlooked, if the two cases are similar in one or 
two relevant respects, like catching something and possessing it. The assumption that the two 
cases are similar is only implicit, however. It is not stated as a premise in the scheme, and is not 
necessarily a part of it. 
     A more specialized scheme for argument from analogy called version 2 in (Walton, Reed and 
Macagno, 2008, 58) is built on the simple version, and does have an explicit statement of 
similarity as its first premise. 
 
Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
Base Premise: A is true (false) in case C1. 
Relevant Similarity Premise: The similarity between C1 and C2 observed so far is relevant to the 
further similarity that is in question. 
Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2. 
 
The problem with this version of the scheme for argument from analogy is that it does not 
appear to be a good fit for the arguments from analogy of the kind illustrated in the examples. 
It depends not only on one similarity premise, but also on another one that may not be easy to 
apply to cases like the baseball case and the animals cases. Two questions about the relevant 
similarity premise need to be answered before this version of the scheme can be applied to the 
similarities thought to hold between the baseball case and the animals cases. First, what does 
‘relevant’ mean here? Guarini (2004, 162) tells us that he did not include the term ‘relevance’ in 
the core scheme because it is common practice not to include relevance claims in argument 
reconstruction. Second, what is the further similarity? This latter expression suggests that the 
existing similarity can be reused in future cases. To explore this idea, we turn to case-based 
reasoning, a technique that reuses a past case to draw conclusions from a current case that is 
similar in certain respects. 
     The methods for employing argument from analogy in case-based reasoning in computing 
use respects in which two cases are similar or different called dimensions and factors. The 
HYPO system (Ashley, 1990) determines how similar a current case is to past cases by having 
the relevant similarities each form a dimension. A dimension is a relevant aspect of the case 
that can take a range of values that move along the scale with values that support one party at 
one end and the other party at the other end of the scale. In the animals cases, possession, 
ownership, and motive would be examples of dimensions. These dimensions can range on a 
scale. For example, a dimension might range through cases where the animals are roaming 
free, cases where the chase had just been started, cases where pursuit was underway, cases of 
mortal wounding, and finally at the other end of the scale, to bodily possession. Once 
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determined in a given case, a dimension will favor either the plaintiff or the defendant in a legal 
case to some degree. For example, in the fox case the plaintiff was in hot pursuit. In the ducks 
case, the plaintiff was acting for economic gain, while the defendant acted from malice. In the 
baseball case, both parties were motivated by money, and the plaintiff would have most likely 
secured the ball had it not been for the assault of the crowd. Bench-Capon (2009, 46) has 
presented a list of four such dimensions in the wild animals cases and the case of Popov v 
Hayashi, and ranked them from most pro-plaintiff to most pro-defendant. 
     CATO is a simpler case-based reasoning system (Aleven, 1997) that was originally designed to 
aid the teaching of law students. It is based on factors, which can be seen as points on a 
dimension. In the wild animals cases the following would be factors: whether the party had 
caught the animal not, whether the party owned the land or area where the animal was, 
whether the party was engaged in earning his living, and whether the two parties were in 
competition with each other. Factors are evaluated as arguments favoring one side or the other 
in relation to social purposes. For example, if the party was engaged in earning his living, that 
would advance the social purpose of the protection of valuable activity. Or if the two parties 
were in competition, that would advance the social purpose of promoting free enterprise.  
     Guarini’s version of the core scheme for argument from analogy has, instead of a general 
premise, a premise that states that the two cases being compared share features that should 
be treated or classified in the same way. These features can be identified with dimensions or 
factors, depending on whether you are using a HYPO-style system or a CATO-style system. If 
features that should be classified in the same way are equivalent to respects in which two cases 
are similar, a simpler version of the core scheme can be cast into the following format, which 
could be called the single respect scheme. 
 
Respects Premise: Case C1 is similar to case C2 in a certain respect. 
Base Premise: A is true (false) in case C1. 
Conclusion: Support is offered to the claim that A is true (false) in case C2. 
 
Where a number of respects are listed, this version becomes equivalent to the core scheme. 
The conclusion makes it clear that this is a defeasible form of argument in which further 
evidence can be introduced that can go against or even defeat the argument. This can happen 
in case-based reasoning, for example, when some factors support A, but then other factors are 
introduced that support not-A. Then to weigh the arguments on each side, we have to consider 
the cases on each side, and determine which cases more on-point, or relevant, that is, the 
extent to which a case’s set of factors covers or overlaps the set of factors in the case at issue. 
These remarks suggest that to make the core scheme useful for case-based reasoning, we need 
to bring in a dialectical framework where there is opposition between two opposed claims, of 
the kind typical in a legal trial, for example.  
     Typically, in this kind of format, we have an argument from analogy or precedent that 
supports a claim A made by one side, and then on the other side an opposed argument from 
analogy or precedent that supports claim not-A. To comparatively weigh up the strength of the 
one argument as compared to the strength of the opposed argument, we have to bring in 
something like dimensions or factors that identify the respects in which one case is similar to 
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the other, and have some device for estimating how similar one is to the other by attaching 
weights to similarity. 
     In fact, case-based reasoning is built on a kind of method that is dialectical in nature. For 
example, HYPO is a case-based system that uses dimensions in a format called three-ply 
argumentation (Ashley, 1988, 206). In the first step, an argument for one side is put forward 
that matches the past case with the desired outcome and that also matches the case at issue. In 
the absence of a response, this argument implies that the side putting forward this move 
should win the dispute. The justification takes the form of an analogy. At the second step, the 
other side can reply by finding a counterexample, a case that shares the same set of dimensions 
with the case at issue as the cited case but has opposite outcome, or by distinguishing a case. 
Distinguishing a case means citing dimensions present in the case at issue that are absent in the 
case it is compared to and that favor the opposite conclusion, and dimensions in the compared 
case that favor its outcome that are not present in the case at issue. This move is a rebuttal to 
the argument of the first move. In the third step, the first party has an opportunity to rebut the 
distinction, offering a rebuttal to a rebuttal by finding other examples that suggest a different 
conclusion, or by citing cases that defend his position. 
     Wyner and Bench-Capon (2007) devised a system of case-based reasoning that includes a set 
of six argument structures they describe as argumentation schemes. For example (143) their 
main scheme (AS1), looks like this, where P is the plaintiff, D the defendant, Pi are the factors, 
CC is the current case and PC is the precedent case.  
 
P Factors Premise: P1 are reasons for P. 
D Factors Premise: P2 are reasons for D. 
Factors Preference Premise: P1 was preferred to P2 in PCi. 
CC Weaker Exception: The priority in PCi does not decide CC. 
Conclusion: Decide CC for P. 
 
The factors are rated on a preference scale, and these preferences are used to derive the 
conclusion. It may be, however, that this scheme does not represent argument from analogy. 
This scheme, as well as the other five schemes Wyner and Bench-Capon employ in their system, 
look more like factor-based species of argument from precedent. This brings us to the scheme 
for argument from precedent and its relation to argument from analogy. 
     The most common type of argument from precedent used in legal reasoning applies to a 
current case, and a prior case that has already been decided is taken as a precedent that can be 
applied to the current case (Schauer, 1987). The argumentation scheme appropriate for this 
type of argument is the following one. 
 
Previous Case Premise: C1 is a previously decided case. 
Previous Ruling Premise: In case C1, rule R was applied and produced finding F. 
New Case Premise: C2 is a new case that has not yet been decided. 
Similarity Premise: C2 is similar to C1 in relevant respects. 
Conclusion: Rule R should be applied to C2 and produce finding F. 
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In the baseball case, the rule that was applied is the one called Gray’s Rule, the rule that to 
have possession of the ball, the actor must retain control of it after incidental contact with 
people and things (McCarthy, 2002, 8). In the baseball case, this rule was applied in a negative 
way. In the animals cases, the rule was set in place that if you don’t catch something, by 
retaining control of it, you do not fit the requirements for possessing it (in the context 
comparing the animals cases and the baseball case). The same rule was then transferred to the 
baseball case. 
     Note that this scheme for argument from precedent is built on an underlying argument from 
analogy represented by the basic scheme (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 72). This way of 
configuring the two schemes makes argument from precedent a species of argument from 
analogy. An advantage of the basic scheme is that it has allowed us to show how some 
revealing relations among the schemes are involved in case-based reasoning. In the next 
section, we will see how argument from classification is an extension of argument from analogy 
typically used in many arguments from precedent. 
     On this basis, AS1 can be taken to be a special instance of argument from precedent of the 
kind specified by the scheme just above. It represents a special subtype of argument from 
precedent that is designed for use in systems of case-based reasoning that employ dimensions 
for weighing the respects in which two cases are similar. The core scheme for argument from 
analogy seems to better represent case-based reasoning techniques using factors or 
dimensions than the basic scheme, since the core scheme specifically represents respects in 
which two cases are similar.  
 
3. Arguments from Classification and Definition 
 
      Guarini (2004, 162) argues that the core scheme does not fit all case of argument from 
analogy. He postulates a second scheme for argument from analogy by extending the core 
scheme to the next one, which we will call the derived scheme (p. 162): 
 
Premise 1: a has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Premise 2: b has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Premise 3: a is X in virtue of  f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Premise 4: a and b should be treated or classified in the same way with respect to f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Conclusion: b is X. 
 
 The derived scheme is in effect a chain argument that is constructed by incorporating the 
conclusion of the core scheme as an additional premise (premise 4) and adding a new premise 
(premise 3). The conclusion then says that individual b fits under the category (predicate) of 
being an X. Thus a way to reconfigure the derived scheme is as follows. 
 
Premise 1: a has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Premise 2: b has features f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
Conclusion 1: a and b should be treated or classified in the same way with respect to f1, f2, . . . , 
fn. 
Premise 3: a is X in virtue of  f1, f2, . . . , fn. 
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Conclusion 2: b is X. 
 
The first three steps represent the core scheme for argument from analogy, and all five steps, 
taken together as a chain of reasoning, represent the derived version. This way of proceeding 
enables us to represent the classification of some individual entity under a general category, 
which is a feature of some arguments from analogy. Classification is very important as part of 
the argument, but it needs further amplification to show how classification is tied to argument 
from analogy in the baseball case. 
    Recalling the details of Judge McCarthy’s analysis of the reasoning in the baseball case, he 
said that the task of the court was taken to be to craft a definition of ‘possession’ that applies 
to the circumstances of the case (McCarthy, 2002, 6). This remark sets in place the first criterion 
for similarity between the baseball case and the precedent animals cases. All are about the 
fundamental issue of possession. The problem was that the distinguished law professors 
disagreed on how possession should be defined. Judge McCarthy then pointed out that 
although the term ‘possession’ appears throughout the law, its definition varies depending on 
the context in which it is used. This situation is not unique to the baseball and animals cases. It 
is typical of legal reasoning of the kind used in trials, as suggested by Hart’s famous example of 
deciding whether a skateboard is a vehicle that ought to be banned from the park (Hart, 1949; 
1961; Loui, 1995). To someone not familiar with disputed cases in legal reasoning, the problem 
looks easy to solve. It looks like all we have to do is to define the concept of vehicle. But in hard 
cases, it is not possible to give a legal definition that provides sufficient support by itself to 
arrive at a decision that resolves the dispute. The underlying reason is that legal concepts like 
‘vehicle’ are open-textured, to employ Hart’s term, or defeasible, to employ the term currently 
in use in logic and computing.  
     As Judge McCarthy put it, the task of the court was taken to craft a definition of ‘possession’ 
that applies to the circumstances of the case. But how can this be done given the conflicting 
opinions on how ‘possession’ should be defined in law? Law articulates rules or principles that 
are sometimes established by the courts based on (1) previous cases, and (2) in other instances 
may even be based on commonly accepted practices that have found their way into law in 
supporting the formulation of such rules. A set of such rules can provide necessary or sufficient 
conditions that function as partial definitions. These rules help the argumentation to move 
forward even in the absence of a fixed definition that is complete and that can be mechanically 
applied to hard cases. The reader will recall from the description of Judge McCarthy’s reasoning 
above that he used Gray’s Rule, the rule that to have possession of the ball, the actor must 
retain control of it after incidental contact with people and things. Gray’s rule was in turn based 
on a set of rules for the first possession of baseballs, accepted as customs and accepted 
practices in baseball. As applied to the baseball case, this rule led to the conclusion that Popov 
did not have possession of the ball. However, in the end, even that finding did not resolve the 
issue of which party had rights to ownership of the ball. 
     To analyze how the arguments from precedents from the animals cases to the baseball case 
are based on a notion of similarity that fits the similarity premise of the scheme for argument 
from precedent, we need to examine some other argumentation schemes that are also 
involved in the baseball case. The first is the scheme for argument from verbal classification 
(Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 319). 
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Individual Premise: a has property F. 
Classification Premise: For all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G. 
Conclusion: a has property G. 
 
The case of the drug-sniffing dog (Brewer, 1996) shows how an argument that has been 
classified in the law literature as argument from analogy is really an instance of arguing from 
analogy to a verbal classification. Suppose that a trained dog sniffs luggage left in a public place 
and signals to the police that it contains drugs. Should this event be classified as a search 
according to the Fourth Amendment? If it can be classified as a search, information obtained as 
a result of the dog sniffing the luggage is not admissible as evidence. If it is not classified as a 
search, the information is admissible (Weinreb, 2008).  
     Ashley’s method of distinguishing between deep and shallow analogies between pairs of 
cases uses an ontology (Ashley, 2009, 8) to represent classifications of concepts to support legal 
reasoning about claims and issues. This ontological framework specifies and organizes classes of 
concepts that can be used to represent the important features of cases. It includes 
representation of actual concepts like ‘animal’, as well as legal concepts like ‘possession’. I take 
this as evidence to support the view that arguments from analogy, as used in law, are based on 
argument from classification, even though the use of argument from classification in the 
sequence of reasoning may not be all that obvious in many instances.   
     On Brewer’s analysis, this first classificatory stage of reasoning by analogy leads to a later 
evaluation stage in which the given event is compared to other cases that have already been 
classified legally as being searches or as not being searches. Ideally, we could define the term 
‘search’ by using a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for what constitutes a search in 
any given case, and then apply the definition to the case at issue. Then we could use the 
argumentation scheme for argument from definition to verbal classification (Walton, Reed and 
Macagno, 2008, 319). 
 
Definition Premise: a fits definition D. 
Classification Premise: For all x, if a fits definition D, then x can be classified as having property 
G. 
Conclusion: a has property G. 
 
However, although this scheme may work in easy cases, where the definition clearly fits the 
case, it falls down when the term at issue is defeasible. Then what we need is a defeasible 
definition, but since the definition is defeasible, it may still be open to contention what 
conclusion it directs us to draw in the case at issue. As the baseball case shows very well, 
argument from definition to verbal classification does not work, and we have to fall back on 
Gray’s rule. Since defeasible definitions are ubiquitous in legal argumentation, as Hart showed, 
and as the cases treated here illustrate, these considerations bring out the importance of 
modeling them in some way that is both precise and useful. 
     The theory of defeasible definitions provided by McCarty and Sridharan (1982) uses what are 
called prototypes and deformations. On this approach, there is an invariant component to 
provide necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the existence of the concept, a set of 
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exemplars, each of which matches some but not all of the instances of the concept, and a set of 
transformations in the definitional expansion which expresses relationships between the 
exemplars.  McCarty and Sridharan state that one exemplar can be mapped into another 
exemplar in a certain way. This method of working with defeasible definitions in argumentation 
in AI and law has been applied to the case of Eisner v. Macomber (252 U.S. 189 (1920)).  
 
4. Similarity   
 
     The basis for deciding whether one case is a precedent for another in law has been the 
subject of debate for generations, and a common view is that a precedent case holds for cases 
that are similar but not identical to it (Schauer, 2009, 46). How this works is easy to see if two 
cases are very similar in obvious respects, but how is a case where a man sued a company 
because there was a decomposed snail in his beer bottle similar to case where a man tried to 
sue because of a defective Buick automobile? The answer is that even though the two cases are 
dissimilar in many respects, they are similar in that they were both consumer transactions that 
caused illness, and the defect was not immediately apparent (Schauer, 2009, 46). But surely just 
these common respects are not enough in themselves to make the one case similar enough to 
the other so that one could be taken as a precedent for the other. There is something about the 
common sequence of events that makes the one case similar to the other. First the plaintiff 
bought some product that he assumed was the normal product he expected, and he thought 
therefore that the product was reasonably safe to use. Then something in the product turned 
out to be defective, and when he used the product this defect caused some harm that impacted 
badly on his health. There is a thread, or sequence of events that is of the same kind in both 
cases. It started in the same way, went through the same kind of chain of events, and ended in 
the same way. Another thing both cases have in common is that both were about recompense 
that the plaintiff claimed was due to him because of this harm he supposedly suffered. They are 
both about the same basic issue that defines the claim to be proved in the lawsuit.  
     What is the similarity between the wild animals cases and the baseball case that enables an 
argument from precedent to be drawn from the one to the other? The situation of a baseball 
hit into the stands where fans jostle to try to retrieve it is not similar to a situation of fishing for 
a whale or hunting a fox. Gray (2002, 1), as quoted above, made the point that catching a 
baseball is not similar to mortally wounding a fox: “a baseball at the end of its arc of descent is 
not at all like a fox racing across the commons, acting under its own volition, desperately 
attempting to evade death at the hands of its pursuers”. Even though the animals are different, 
and the details of how they are caught or pursued are different, the wild animals cases are 
similar among themselves. They are all about pursuing, catching, wounding and holding wild 
animals, and about which party has the right to possession of the animal at the end of the 
process. In most of these respects, the whales cases, the fox case, and the ducks case are 
similar. They are all about this same process of pursuing and possessing wild animals. The 
baseball case is noticeably different. It is not about pursuing, catching or possessing a wild 
animal. 
     So what similarity is there that supports the transfer via the arguments from precedent from 
the earlier ones to the later one? It is not just the element of possession, for there are many 
cases of disputes about possession of something that are not similar enough to these cases to 
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provide precedents for them. The similarity involves both possession and this pursuing and 
catching process. All the cases are about catching something, or attempting to catch it, and 
about which party may rightly be said to possess it at the end of this attempting to catch 
process. They are also about someone else interfering with this process, and preventing the 
other party from catching and possessing the animal. 
     When you abstract away from the details of the animals cases and the baseball case that are 
not relevant in the argument from analogy that connects them, what is left is a template linking 
a series of events and questions into an ordered sequence. If we distinguish following Ashley 
(2009) between deep and shallow analogies, a template that matches up the same sequence 
fitting two cases can reveal a deep similarity that is more significant, as opposed to a shallow 
similarity in which the two cases do not appear to be similar. The sequence template for the 
deep similarity that runs through the animals cases and the baseball case is visually represented 
in figure 1. In the next section, it will be shown how such sequence templates can be 
represented as abstract structures that can be applied to real cases of arguments from analogy. 
     If this analysis of this special type of similarity between these pairs of cases is correct, the 
consequences for studying how argument from precedent is based on argument from analogy 
are highly significant. When we say that two disputed cases are similar, and therefore that the 
one case can work as a precedent for the other, it doesn’t mean that the two cases appear to 
be similar in many respects, so that there has to be a visual match of some sort between them. 
This pattern recognition kind of similarity represents only a superficial type of similarity. 
Superficially, the cases initially look very different. It looks like there is no basis for a compelling 
argument from analogy between them. It’s only when you probe into them further, and detect 
a sequence in how the concepts in each case are tied together in a template within the 
argumentation about the dispute at issue, and see how this template affects the reasoning on 
each side, that the similarity important for precedent emerges. McLaren (2003; 2006) has 
developed a two-stage case retrieval system in SIROCCO that assessed similarity of cases in 
terms of sequence of events and demonstrated empirically the utility of the approach in 
improving retrieval of relevant engineering ethics cases involving engineering ethics code 
provisions. The template is just one small part in the larger structure of the dialogue in a case 
(Ashley, 2004; 2009, 9) that goes through several stages.  
     These observations suggest that there are three stages to using argument from analogy. At 
the first stage, two cases may look similar, and this apparent match may suggest a rough 
analogy that could be used to support an argument from analogy. At the second stage, a closer 
look at the similarity premise can be given, to see whether the similarity is merely visually 
apparent, as an instance of pattern recognition, or whether there is a logical similarity of the 
kind that can be supported by applying a template like that pictured in figure 1. The third stage 
is the evaluation of the argument from analogy, by citing and comparing the respects in which 
the one case is similar to (or dissimilar from) the other. Although the basic scheme for 
argument from analogy is initially the more useful for identifying this type of argument at an 
early stage, when you get to the later stages of analyzing and evaluating arguments from 
analogy, the core scheme becomes more useful. 
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Figure 1: Sequence Template for Similarity of the Animals and Baseball Cases  
 
     In these cases, you have to recognize that the dispute is about possession of the contested 
entity, and the reasoning relates to details of this attempting to catch process, how it went 
along the way as the two parties took part in it, and how it ended up. The similarity between 
these cases that supports argument from analogy and argument from precedent needs to be 
represented by a typical sequence of actions, events and questions of the kind shown in figure 
1. Seven steps in the sequence are episodes, and the last two are questions. In this example, 
the first seven steps represent a sequence of intentional actions of an agent, and something 
that interferes with the agent’s achieving his goal.  
 
5. Scripts and Stories 
 
     Commonly known ways of carrying out everyday activities were codified in early work in AI 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977) in sequences called scripts. The standard example is the restaurant 
14 
script, an ordered set of seven statements. 1. John went to a restaurant. 2. The hostess seated 
John. 3. The waitress gave John a menu. 4. John ordered a lobster. 5. He was served. 6. He left a 
tip. 7. He left the restaurant. Gaps in the sequence can be made explicit by defeasible 
inferences based on common knowledge about the way things are normally done in the script. 
For example, we can infer defeasibly that lobster was on the menu. It would be an exception if 
lobster was a special item not listed on the menu, and the waitress told John about it. However, 
the gap-filling inference can be drawn if there is no information to the contrary, because 
normally restaurant customers get their information about what to order from the menu.  
     Modules called MOPs, or memory organization packages (Schank, 1986), that also represent 
stereotyped sequences of events, are used in case-based reasoning (Leake, 1992). They are 
smaller than scripts and can be combined in a way that is appropriate for the situation when 
they are needed. For example, the space launch MOP includes a launch, a space walk and a re-
entry (Leake, 1992, 73). Scripts and MOPs can be used to build or amplify what is often called a 
story, a connected sequence of events or actions that hangs together, is ordered as a sequence, 
and that contains gaps that can be filled in.  
     Pennington and Hastie (1993), among other authors, have argued that understanding actions 
carried out in criminal cases is done by constructing competing stories about what supposedly 
happened using the evidence in the case. The method is to find the best story, the best script 
connecting the known facts, or at any rate the one that seems most plausible based on the 
evidence. Such a plausible story describes a general pattern of states of kinds that we are all 
normally familiar with. The problem is that a plausible story may not be very well supported by 
the evidence whereas a less plausible story may be supported by more evidence. To deal with 
this problem (Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag, 1993) devised a special type of story used 
to represent legal reasoning called an anchored narrative. (Bex, 2009) has proposed a hybrid 
framework for reasoning with arguments, stories and criminal evidence, a formal framework 
that shows how the plausibility of the story can be evaluated by giving arguments that ground 
the story on evidence that supports or attacks it.  
     Pennington and Hastie (1993) also had the idea that the plausibility of a story can be tested 
by its evidential support. They devised the notion of an episode scheme, which is like a script or 
MOP except that it can be more abstract or more specific. An example would be a scheme for 
intentional action that describes the general pattern of events in the restaurant script, by citing 
the events of ordering, eating paying (Bex, 2009a, 94).  Bex (2009) combined the episode 
schemes of Pennington and Hastie with the scripts of Schank and his colleagues to form what 
are called story schemes. These are modeled as an ordered list of events or types of events that 
can be more abstract or more specific. Bex (2009, 59) offers the following example. John 
Haaknat is a drug addict who needs money and decides to rob a supermarket.  He gets the 
money and jumps into his car and takes off, but seeing the police he parks his car at a nearby 
park and then jumps into a moat to hide. Later the police search the park and find him soaking 
wet from the water in the moat. Bex (2009, 59) constructs a graph that exhibits the causal 
relations between the various events in the story, as shown in figure 2.  
 
15 
 
                               Figure 2: Causal Structure of the Haaknat Story 
 
Bex (2009, 59) calls it a causal structure, because it contains implicit causal relations assumed 
by the reader of the story that enable the reader to connect the sequence as a series of events 
and actions that make sense. We can recognize it as a story, even though not all the events and 
causal relations have been rendered explicitly. 
 
6. Modeling the Sequence Template as a Story Scheme 
 
      Evidential reasoning in law is typically based on general knowledge accepted in a certain 
community, codified in the form of generalizations (Bex et al., 2003). Examples of such 
generalizations are ‘the forceful impact of a hammer can cause a person’s skull to break’, and 
‘witnesses under oath usually speak the truth’ (Bex, 2009, 18). Generalizations can default 
when applied to specific instances. For example, it may not be true that the forceful impact of a 
plastic hammer can cause a person's skull to break. A story scheme is a collection of literal 
schemes and (causal) generalizations schemes that fits the following definition (Bex, 2009, 126).  
Definition: a story scheme   Schemes is a set comprised of literal schemes and causal 
generalizations such that the set of components ( ) =   {  or  is the 
antecedent or the consequent of some .  
Both generalizations and story schemes can be abstract as well as specific. The underlying logic 
of this framework is based on a set of inference rules for classical logic combined with a 
defeasible modus ponens rule for the conditional operator ⇒ that represents defeasible 
generalizations (Bex and Prakken, 2010).  A generalization has the form p1 & p2  & . . . & pn ⇒ q . 
A generalization with free variables is a scheme for all its ground instances, and a literal scheme 
is a scheme for all its ground instances.  For example (Bex, 2009, 126), ‘x robs y’ is a scheme for 
‘Haaknat robs supermarket’ and also a scheme for ‘John robs bank’. A story scheme can also 
contain causal links, as in the following example: {motive ⇒C goal, goal ⇒C action, action ⇒C 
consequence}. 
     A set of events or actions in a story corresponds to a component of the story scheme if the 
scheme is derivable from the events through a process of applying abstractions. This process of 
linking to particular events or actions described in the story to their representation in a more 
Haaknat is 
a drug 
addict who 
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money. 
Haaknat 
decides 
to rob 
the 
market. 
Police 
arrive. 
Haaknat 
thinks 
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are after 
him. 
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the 
park. 
Haaknat  
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market. 
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and 
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Haaknat 
is found 
in the 
moat. 
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abstract level by a story scheme is explained by Bex (2009, 127) with two examples. In the first 
example, the event ‘Haaknat robs supermarket’ is a particular instance of the abstract scheme 
‘x robs y’ straightforwardly, and a more complex inferential process that Bex calls an explicit 
abstraction generalization is not needed. In the second example, however, a more complex 
process is required. In this example, ‘Haaknat robs supermarket’ is said to correspond to the 
action component of the intentional action scheme through the abstraction generalization 
Haaknat robs supermarket ⇒A action because {Haaknat robs supermarket}  {Haaknat robs 
supermarket ⇒A action} ⊢A action.  
    The sequence template shown in figure 1, classified as an episode scheme in the sense of 
Pennington and Hastie (1993), can also be seen at a higher level abstraction as a story scheme 
in the sense of Bex (2009, 2009a), as we now show.  
 
     
Figure 3: Story Scheme that the Baseball Case Shares with Animals cases 
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The story scheme shown in figure 3 is an abstraction, a template that offers a way of 
representing the sequence of actions in the template at a higher level of abstraction 
representing a story as a connected causal sequence.  
     In the cases discussed in this paper, the story scheme in figure 3 links the fox case, the fish 
case, and the whale case all together as similar in relevant respects, and links each of them to 
the baseball case. This does not mean that each case is similar to each other one in every 
respect, or even in every relevant respect. It only means that they are similar in that they all 
share a certain abstract pattern as a story scheme that fits the general causal sequence 
represented in figure 3. 
     At this point we have represented the notion of similarity that argument from analogy is 
based on, by adapting the story scheme structure of Bex (2009) that evolved from the story-
based approach to reasoning about factual issues in criminal cases. This analysis offers a better 
way of showing how to marshal evidence in support of the similarity premise in an argument 
from analogy. It also offers support for the view that version 2 of the argumentation scheme for 
argument from analogy applies better to cases like those exploiting the analogy between the 
animals cases and the baseball case than version 1. However, we still have not posed the 
question of how to evaluate arguments from analogy that fit version 2 of the argumentation 
scheme. Some clues as to how to go about this are suggested by the dialogue structures used 
by Bex (2009, 139- 156) and by the formal dialogue game designed for use in investigating 
stories by Bex and Prakken (2010). Arguments from analogy are defeasible, because even 
though an analogy can be strong in certain respects, it can always be attacked by showing that 
it fails to hold, or is weak, in other respects. It is suggested in the next section that some  
directions on how to approach the problem of evaluation of arguments from analogy are 
offered by finding some resources from case-based reasoning and from these dialogue models. 
 
7. Dialectical Aspects of Argument from Analogy 
 
     Using the Haaknat example again, Bex and Prakken (2010, 5) show how two competing 
explanations that are offered as evidence in a criminal case can be evaluated to see which is the 
better explanation. One criterion they use is evidential coverage, meaning how many 
arguments can be used to support claims that are parts of the explanation. Haaknat was found 
hiding in a moat in the park after the robbery, and the prosecution explanation was that he had 
fled there after the robbery to avoid arrest. Haaknat offered a different explanation. He argued 
that he was hiding in the moat because he had an argument with a man over some money, and 
this man had drawn a knife. Haaknat’s explanation was that he had fled to escape this man. 
There are various criteria that can be used to evaluate which is the more plausible explanation, 
internal consistency of each story being one of them. Bex and Prakken provide a formal 
dialogue model that represents a process of evaluation in which each side presents arguments 
to support its own story, and asks critical questions to test and throw doubt on the plausibility 
of the other party’s story. The same kind of dialogue model can also be used to provide a 
method for evaluating the strength of an argument from analogy, the case in point being the 
analogy between the baseball case and the previous animal cases. 
     Judge McCarthy (2002, 9) ruled that although Popov did not retain control of the ball, other 
factors need to be considered. One factor is that his efforts to retain control were interrupted 
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by a violent mob of wrongdoers. Another is the principle that if an agent takes steps to achieve 
possession of a piece of abandoned property, but is interrupted by the actions of others, he has 
a pre-possessory interest in the property. After examining all the arguments, Judge McCarthy 
decided that any award to one party would be unfair to the other, and that each had an equal 
and undivided interest in the ball. In the end, the precedents from the animals cases did not 
decide the outcome of the case. But still, they did help to support Gray’s rule, and Gray’s rule 
acted as a partial definition of possession that influenced the line of reasoning that led to the 
decision. So argument from precedent and argument from analogy, as well as argument from 
classification and definition, were important in understanding how the sequence of 
argumentation in the case went.  
     The baseball case suggests that argument from analogy cannot be analyzed and evaluated in 
specific cases without placing its use within a broader context where there is a disputed issue. 
This context includes a sequence of argumentation relevant to that issue that it intended to 
resolve it by weighing the arguments on both sides. How does the process of applying these 
schemes to evaluating the arguments by fitting them to cases in this context work? 
 
 The process uses general rules derived from legally authoritative sources by statutory 
interpretation.  
 It uses arguments from analogy to previous decided cases. 
 Argument from precedent is based on argument from analogy. 
 It uses argument from established rules from these sources. 
 In some instances, it uses argument from generally accepted practices in specific kinds 
of practical activity domains.  
 It uses and arrives at classifications based on these rules. 
 Instead of fixed definitions, it uses defeasible partial definitions in the form of necessary 
and sufficient condition rules. 
 It applies these rules to the problematic case that needs to be decided by examining and 
weighing the arguments pro and contra based on the evidence from these and other 
sources. 
 
The argumentation in a trial can be viewed in this context as a pro-contra dialogue process in 
which one side puts forward arguments, the other side puts forward opposed arguments, and 
then each side gets a chance to critically examine the claims and arguments of the other side. 
Critical questioning, therefore, as well as argumentation schemes representing the different 
types of arguments, are both important. The task of weighing the arguments requires looking at 
how each argument can be questioned and attacked (Atkinson et al., 2007). Matching each 
scheme there is a set of typical critical questions that can be used to reply to an argument of 
that type by probing into its weak points.  
     The dialogue game of Bex and Prakken (2010) is designed to regulate the discussion in a 
criminal case where both players want to find a plausible explanation for the facts of the case, 
and where the goal is to find the best explanation. Each competing explanation is modeled as a 
story that can be supported or attacked by the factual evidence in the case, and also evaluated 
by other criteria like internal consistency. Even though in this paper the central concern is not 
explanation but argument from analogy, this dialogue game is useful because it contains 
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arguments, and easily accommodates the use of defeasible argumentation schemes (Prakken, 
2005). In such a dialogue, or another comparable type of dialogue of the kinds used in artificial 
intelligence and law, when an argument is put forward it can be attacked in several ways. When 
an argument from analogy is initially put forward, it is possible that there is a strong or even 
striking similarity between the case at issue and the analogous case. As the dialogue proceeds, 
however, questions may arise on whether the two cases are similar in certain specific respects 
or dissimilar in other respects. It is a sequence of argument moves during a particular stage of a 
dialogue that determines how strong the argument from analogy should be taken to be, from a 
logical point of view. It is this dialogue sequence that should provide the basis for evaluating 
the strength of the argument from analogy. 
     As noted above, HYPO processes cases based on arguments from analogy and precedent 
using the process called three-ply argumentation (Ashley, 1988, 206). First, an argument for 
one side is constructed by finding a past case in which the outcome closely matches that of the 
desired outcome of the case under consideration, based on the dimensions. Second, the other 
side can reply in one of several ways. The other side can reply by finding a counterexample, a 
past case that matches the current case but which has the opposite outcome. Another reply is 
to distinguish the case by pointing to dimensions present in the current case that are absent in 
the precedent. Third, the original party can offer a rebuttal of the previous move by making 
several kinds of moves. These include distinguishing counterexamples, pointing out additional 
dimensions, or citing cases which show that weakness identified does not rebut his position. 
The three-ply argumentation could be used to effectively set up the pre and post conditions for 
a dialogue model of HYPO, for example by specifying sets of critical questions for argument 
from precedent.  
     The three-ply HYPO sequence can be compared to the set of critical questions matching 
version 1 of the argument from analogy (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 315). 
  
CQ1: Are there differences between C1 and C2 that would tend to undermine the force of the 
similarity cited? 
CQ2: Is A true (false) in C1? 
CQ3: Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which A is false (true)? 
 
CQ1 corresponds to the reply in HYPO of distinguishing the case by pointing to dimensions 
present in the current case that are absent in the precedent and that favor the opposite 
conclusion, and dimensions in the precedent that favor its outcome that are not present in the 
current case. CQ3 corresponds to the reply in HYPO of finding a counterexample. The reply of 
offering a rebuttal in HYPO fits under CQ2. The reply of citing cases which show that weakness 
identified does not rebut his position is not illustrated in the baseball case, but it could suggest 
a continuation of the argument by further pro and contra argumentation.  
 
8. Two Other Test Cases and their Implications 
 
     There are many different types of arguments from analogy, and the tools for analysis applied 
to the Popov case in this paper fit some better than others. However, in this section it is most 
useful to deal briefly with two cases. The first one is interesting because its basic structure 
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appears to be fairly simple in the way it fits the story scheme. The second one brings up some 
important points concerning the relationship between the two schemes for argument from 
analogy set out in section 1. 
     One of the most famous cases of argument from analogy in public affairs is the hypothetical 
violinist case (quoted below), used to argue that abortion is permissible in (Thomson, 1971, 48-
49). 
 
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. 
A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the 
Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you 
alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the 
violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract 
poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, 
we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you - we would never have permitted it if we 
had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would 
be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his 
ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.”  
 
This hypothetical case has been taken to be highly persuasive as an ethical argument on the 
abortion issue, even though there is a large amount of literature containing arguments 
supporting and attacking it. When this case is presented to a respondent, he or she is likely to 
agree that the person attached to the violinist has the right to unplug himself. According to the 
argument from analogy, this statement fits together with the similarity premise to enable the 
conclusion to be drawn that a pregnant woman has the right to terminate her pregnancy, even 
though the fetus will die as a result. Thomson’s argument is that the person in the source case 
who unplugs the violinist does not violate his right to life, because the violinist has no right to 
the use of that other person’s body. By argument from analogy, we are then led to the 
conclusion that abortion does not violate the fetus's right to life but merely deprives the fetus 
of the use of the pregnant woman's body, something which the fetus has no right to. 
     This case can be analyzed using the following episode scheme: {person x has had another 
person y attached to his body without x having any choice; having y attached is an 
encumbrance that will hinder x’s daily activities; x and y are attached in such a way that y will 
die if removed from x; y can only survive when removed from x after a period of 9 months; x 
can make a choice about whether to have y removed or not}. This story scheme presents an 
abstract structure that applies both to the violinist case and to a case at issue about a woman 
who has become pregnant. The conclusion drawn from the description of the person attached 
to the violinist is designed to elicit  the idea  that the person to whom the violinist was attached 
should have the right to choose to have him detached. By argument from analogy, the 
conclusion drawn is that a woman who has become pregnant due to rape should have the right 
to have an abortion.   
     The violinist case has been much discussed in the ethical literature, and many arguments pro 
and contra have been put forward by citing the respects in which the two cases are similar or 
different.  Objections to the argument have tended to proceed by arguing that there are 
important differences between the violinist case and cases of a mother aborting a fetus. One 
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such objection is that the argument extends only to cases of abortion where the pregnancy was 
caused by rape. In the violinist case, the person kidnapped did nothing himself to cause the 
violinist to be attached to him, whereas in typical abortion cases, the pregnant woman chose to 
have intercourse. Another difference is that the fetus is the woman's child while the violinist is 
a stranger.  
     The argument from analogy initially appears plausible, for two reasons. One is that there 
appears to be a striking similarity between the two cases because the story scheme ties 
together a set of common elements in a sequence that both cases exhibit. The other reason is 
that in the violinist case it seems reasonable to conclude that the person attached to the 
violinist should have the right to remove him, assuming that is he not obliged in any way to 
support the violinist by undergoing the arduous procedure that is necessary. When you 
combine these two reasons, the violinist case appears to present a strong argument from 
analogy that is in favor of the conclusion it was put forward to support. But as differences are 
explored as well as similarities, the argument begins to seem less compelling. 
     The basic problem we started out with in this paper is that there seemed to be two different 
argumentation schemes for argument from analogy, and it seems difficult to choose which one 
is the better, or which one should generally be used. One scheme is very simple. It simply states 
that when two cases are similar, and where some conclusion can be drawn in the one case, a 
comparable conclusion should also be drawn in the other case. The other scheme is more 
complex. It says that two cases are similar in certain respects, allowing for the possibility they 
may also be different in other respects, and then it claims that the respects in which they are 
similar are decisive, or outweigh the respects in which they are different. On this basis, it claims 
that because some conclusion can be drawn in one case, a comparable conclusion should also 
be drawn in the other. The more complex scheme easily fits the case-based models of 
argument from analogy that use factors or dimensions.  
     What is the relationship between these two forms of argument? Here the following 
hypothesis is put forward, based on the approach that when an argument from analogy is first 
used at some stage of a dialogue to persuade the other party to accept a claim, it needs to be 
tested and evaluated by means of a sequence of argumentation that follows from this initial 
move. When the argument is first put forward it is in the structure of the simple version of the 
scheme, but later during the sequence, as critical questions are posed and counter-arguments 
are put forward, the more complex version of the scheme is the structure that the 
argumentation best fits. 
     A test case that is interesting to briefly consider is from copyright law. Striking similarity has 
sometimes been used as an argument that relies on similarities or claimed identities between 
two works to prove that there was a violation of copyright law in which one party copied some 
intellectual property belonging to the other. In law, in order to prove such a copyright violation 
there are two component claims that have to be proved, copying and improper appropriation 
of copyrightable expression. In the absence of direct evidence of copying, one may meet the 
burden of proving copying indirectly by showing that the alleged copier had access to the work 
and that the two works are substantially similar.  The doctrine of striking similarity arises 
because two works, for example two songs, can be so strikingly alike in their sounds, their 
notes, and the sequences of tones and cadences in the melodies, that it might seem to 
someone suspecting his or her work has been stolen that there could be absolutely no doubt 
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that the one has been copied from the other. However, such an appearance of similarity or 
even identity can be misleading when drawing an inference about copying. There could be 
other explanations. It could be merely coincidence, or both parties may have copied from a 
common source in the public domain. Hence striking similarity should not, by itself, be regarded 
as sufficient evidence to fulfill the burden of proof for establishing violation of copyright. 
Arguments from analogy based on such a striking similarity, nevertheless are highly persuasive, 
because of the powerful psychological effect of the perceived similarity.  The nature of the 
problem is indicated in Judge Frank’s often-cited opinion in Arnstein v. Porter (154 F.2d 464 (2nd 
Cir. 1946) to the effect that even where access is absent, the similarity can be so striking that it 
precludes the possibility that the plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the same 
result. This ruling could be “disastrous” (Patry, 2005/06) if it were used as a sufficient basis for 
justifying an inference of copying in all circumstances. The problem is to judge why this kind of 
direct inference from striking similarity to a conclusion of copyright violation represents a kind 
of inference that jumps to a conclusion quickly while overlooking other evidence that needs to 
be taken into account.  
     Arguments from striking similarity are based on the simple version of the argumentation 
scheme for argument from analogy. If the analogy between two cases is striking, meaning that 
it is much stronger and more convincing than the usual kind of comparison between cases, the 
argument initially appears to be so strong that it is frozen at the initial stage. Instead of moving 
on to the sequence of argumentation including critical questioning and counter arguments, the 
sequence stops there. What this shows is that if we go exclusively by the simple version of 
argument from analogy, the argument may appear so powerfully persuasive that it jumps to a 
simplistic conclusion without taking into account other relevant evidence that needs to be 
considered. The hypothesis that both schemes need to be used can help to explain what has 
gone wrong when an argument from analogy based on striking similarity jumps to a premature 
conclusion. It initially provides some legitimate evidence to support an ultimate claim based on 
a highly persuasive analogy, but its evaluation has not proceeded far enough into the 
subsequent sequence of argumentation in the dialogue to properly take into account all the 
relevant evidence that needs to be considered. It is precisely for these reasons that jumping to 
a conclusion is a form of argumentation often associated with logical errors and informal 
fallacies (Walton and Gordon, 2009).  
       Finally, we need to note in this section that on one model of legal argumentation, the 
sharpness of the dispute over which scheme of the two is the best one to represent the logical 
structure of argument from analogy can be softened. Carneades (Gordon and Walton, 2006) is 
a mathematical and computational model of legal argumentation that builds on ontologies 
from the semantic web. Carneades has been implemented using a functional programming 
language, and has a graphical user interface in which a given argument is visualized as a 
directed graph (Gordon and Walton, 2009).  Carneades is a system for reasoning with 
argumentation schemes, and has the distinctive feature that it manages the critical questions 
matching a scheme into three categories, thereby enabling them to be treated as premises of 
the scheme, in some instances additional implicit premises (Walton and Gordon, 2005). It 
would be easy to manage critical questions by modeling them as additional premises in a 
scheme, except that there are two different variations on what happens when a respondent 
asks a critical question. In some instances, when a critical question is asked, a burden of proof 
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shifts to the proponent’s side to answer it, and if this burden is not fulfilled the argument is 
defeated. In other instances, merely asking the question does not defeat the proponent’s 
argument until the respondent offers some evidence to back it up. To cope with variation, 
Carneades distinguishes three types of premises, called ordinary premises, assumptions and 
exceptions. An assumption is not explicitly stated in the premises of a scheme, but behaves like 
an ordinary premise, one that was explicitly stated. An assumption is taken to hold, so that if a 
critical question is directed to it, and some evidence is not given to support it in line with the 
questioning, it now fails to hold. An exception is not taken to hold unless evidence can be given 
to show that it does hold. By treating the argumentation schemes and their matching critical 
questions this way, the Carneades system makes it less crucial whether some factor that is 
important for evaluating an argument that fits a scheme is treated as a premise of the scheme 
or as a critical question matching the scheme.  
     We can classify the critical questions matching version 1 of the scheme for argument 
analogy, as shown in section 7, as follows. The second critical question merely asks whether 
one of the premises is true, so it can be treated as a normal premise. The first and third 
questions cite specific differences or another case that is needed to furnish evidence required 
to call the argument from analogy into question. So they are best treated as exceptions.  
     What these observations reveal is that if we use Carneades to model argumentation from 
analogy, the critical question that asks whether there are differences between the two cases 
can be represented as an additional premise of the simple scheme. This appears to show that 
there is a transition from the simple scheme to the more complex scheme. This transition 
appears to represent a typical sequence of dialogue in which the argument from analogy is 
analyzed in greater depth. In the simple scheme, the factors or dimensions appear only in the 
critical questions, but in the more complex version of the scheme, more of them appear in the 
scheme itself. From the point of view of the Carneades model, since critical questions can be 
represented by fitting them into the scheme and treating them as premises, and since counter- 
arguments can be represented in a dialogue format, the structure allows for an orderly 
transition from the application of the one scheme to the other. But before this transition can be 
properly understood, both schemes need to be revised. 
 
9. Reconfiguring the Schemes 
 
     What is the best argumentation scheme and the best set of critical questions for argument 
from analogy, from among those surveyed in section 2? The best one to work with initially is 
the following modified version of the simplest scheme from (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 
315).  
 
Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2, based on their shared scheme story. 
Base Premise: A is the conclusion to be drawn in case C1. 
Conclusion: The conclusion B, comparable to A in case C1, based on their shared scheme story, 
is to be drawn in case C2. 
 
The violinist case can be used to illustrate how this argumentation scheme applies to an 
argument from analogy. The similarity premise is the statement that the case of the person 
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with the violinist attached to his body is similar to the case of a woman with a pregnancy due to 
rape. The base premise is the statement that the conclusion to be drawn in the violinist case is 
that the person attached to the violinist should have the right to detach him. The comparable 
conclusion to be drawn in the pregnant woman case is that she should have the right to an 
abortion.  
     In light of the examples studied in the paper, and especially in light of the use of models in 
artificial intelligence based on factors and dimensions, the following set of critical questions 
matching the scheme is now proposed. 
 
CQ1: Are there respects in which C1 and C2 are different that would tend to undermine the 
force of the similarity cited? 
CQ2: Is A the right conclusion to be drawn in C1? 
CQ3: Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which some conclusion other 
than A should be drawn? 
 
It should be noted here that the first critical question relates to a factors or dimensions that 
represent similarities or differences between the two cases that tend either to support or 
detract from the argument from analogy. Another way to look at this critical question, 
therefore, is as an initial point in a sequence of dialogue that goes into pro and contra 
arguments with respect to the claim made in the argument from analogy. The third critical 
question also represents a kind of counter argument that is often called a counter analogy in 
logic textbooks, a second argument from analogy directed against the first one that goes to the 
opposite conclusion of the first one. The critical questions can be viewed as representing 
species of counter-arguments, and as well, on the Carneades model, they can be viewed as 
species of premises of the scheme. On this model, their function is to shift the burden of proof 
from the one side to the other in dialogue. Thus we can see that there are different ways of 
evaluating arguments from analogy, but the main functions of the simplest version of the 
argumentation scheme and its matching set of critical questions are to enable us to identify 
arguments from analogy, and to provide at least some entry point for instructing a beginner 
about questioning them. 
     Once we have identified and analyzed the argumentation in a given instance as an argument 
from analogy using the story scheme model of the similarity premise along with the other 
premise, we typically want to go on to the next tasks of analyzing and evaluating the argument. 
This takes us to the following sequence of the argumentation following the initial use of the 
argument from analogy in the dialogue. The best device that is useful at this stage is case-based 
reasoning with its use of dimensions and factors. The simple scheme above is the best 
representation of the form of argument from analogy to be used, however, because it 
distinguishes the respects in which one case is similar to another, based on the story scheme 
common to the two cases. These respects can then be added to or challenged by bringing out 
new ones, or new differences between the two cases, i.e. factors or dimensions. 
     During the process of argument evaluation, there is a two-part dialogue sequence 
representing how an argument from analogy is typically put forward initially and then later 
critically questioned and examined in more detail for its strengths and weaknesses. In the first 
part, the argument from analogy appears plausible if there is a story scheme into which the 
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sequence template for the two cases fits. Such a fit makes the argument from analogy appear 
strong by supporting the similarity premise of the basic scheme. The basic scheme does not 
distinguish between other additional respects that may be brought out in which the one case is 
arguably similar to the other or dissimilar. However, during the next part of the sequence, 
issues concerning specific respects in which the one case is similar to the other or not may 
arise.  
     Guarini’s version of the scheme for argument from analogy (section 2), has a premise that 
states that the two cases being compared share a set of common features. By treating features 
as equivalent to respects in which two cases are similar, a simpler version of the core scheme 
was recast into what we called the single respect scheme. To fit with the new version of the 
simplest scheme above, we now offer this reformulated version of the single respect scheme.  
 
Respects Premise: Case C1 is similar to case C2 in a certain respect. 
Base Premise: A is the conclusion to be drawn in case C1. 
Conclusion: the conclusion comparable to A in C1 is to be drawn in case C2. 
 
Where a number of respects are brought together by using the single respect scheme, 
repeatedly to cite several common features in which the two cases are held to be similar, the 
single respect scheme becomes equivalent to Guarini’s core scheme. Respects, or features if 
you will, can be identified with dimensions or factors, depending on whether you are using a 
HYPO-style system or a CATO-style system.  
     When the simple scheme is applied to a case, there are already some points of similarity, as 
well as a general pattern of similarity, postulated by the story scheme. The single respects 
scheme is supposed to go beyond this level by citing specific features the two cases share. To 
make this scheme useful in relation to the simple scheme, we have to define ‘respect’ as 
referring to a specific feature in which two cases are held to be similar. In this way, the single 
respect scheme is an extension of the simple scheme.  
     Next, the problem is to fit the simplest scheme and its matching set of critical questions 
alongside the single respect scheme into a dialogue framework in which they can be employed 
alongside each other. How this will work is that the new version of the simple scheme is applied 
at the first point in the dialogue where the argument from analogy is put forward. Next, the 
critical questions are asked, and the first critical question concerns respects in which C1 and C2 
may be different. Put in a stronger form, this critical question could be a counterargument that 
draws a conclusion that is the negation of the original argument from analogy, based on the 
premise that there are one or more respects in which the two cases are different. This is a 
contra argument, but there is also a matching pro argument of the type represented by the 
single respect scheme. So the single respect scheme represents a form of argument that is 
opposed to the counterargument based on different respects. Such a pattern of argumentation 
is common in case-based reasoning where some factors support the conclusion A, but then 
other factors are cited that support the conclusion not-A. As noted, case-based reasoning 
weighs the arguments on both sides by considering the cases on each side and determining 
which cases are more on-point, or relevant in terms of the overlap of each case’s factors with 
those of the current case. Fitting together these arguments and critical questions needs to be 
done in a dialectical framework where an argument from analogy is initially put forward and 
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then challenged, initially by asking critical questions, but then at a later stage by probing into 
specific respects in which two cases are similar or different. What we see is that there is a 
surface level that represents the initial impact of putting forward an argument from analogy, 
and a deeper level of analysis and criticism in which specific respects of similarity or difference 
are specified in weight against each other.  
     Our new version of the simplest scheme for argument from analogy has three components, 
the similarity premises, the base premise and the conclusion. The single respect scheme, and 
the multiple variants of it corresponding to Guarini’s scheme are addressed to the similarity 
premise. Depending on whether the respect cited is a pro or contra factor, the respect scheme 
will be an argument for or against the similarity premise. Notice that when an argument fitting 
such a respect scheme is brought forward, we are now at the evaluation stage. When the 
argument from analogy is originally brought forward in the form of an argument fitting the 
simple scheme, we are just at the presentation stage where the argument, if the similarity fits a 
plausible story scheme, will be a provisionally acceptable argument. But when the dialogue 
starts to go into a discussion of specific similarities and differences between the two cases, we 
have now entered the evaluation stage. In other words, during this stage the question being 
discussed is how plausible the argument is. The important thing to note is that when the 
specific respects in which the one case is similar to or different from the other are being put 
forward, the arguments are either supporting the similarity premise or attacking it. The first 
critical question of the simple scheme represents this kind of attack on the similarity premise, 
whereas the third critical question represents a different kind of argument. In this different kind 
of argument, the counter-argument purports to prove the negation of the conclusion of the 
simplest scheme.  
 
10. Conclusions 
 
     Judge McCarthy’s remark cited at the beginning of section 7 shows that the fundamental 
task of the trial in the baseball case was to craft a definition of possession that would be 
applicable to the case. The court partly carried out this task by using defeasible rules for partly 
defining possession of baseballs. But these rules failed to resolve the issue of which party 
should legally have ownership of the contested baseball. What the trial showed is that although 
the baseball case is about argument from classification and definitions, as well as about 
argument from analogy, the argument from definition cannot solve the problem by itself. It 
cannot be solved by itself because the concept of possession that needs to be defined is open-
textured, and how it should be applied varies with the context of each individual case. Another 
more general lesson learned is that the philosophical notions of definition and analogy that we 
started out with did not work very well as applied to the task of seeing how arguments from 
precedent are based on arguments from analogy. In particular, we see that the schemes for 
argument from analogy have to be reconfigured, and fitted in to the schemes for argument 
from classification and argument from precedent to provide a basis for revealing how legal 
arguments from precedent work.  
     The most important conclusion of the paper is that when similarity is defined in the way 
indicated using story schemes, we can reconfigure the argumentation schemes for argument 
from analogy in the way shown in section 9, and thereby solve the problem of how they should 
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fit together. The new version of the simple scheme functions as a device for identifying any 
given instance of an argument from analogy in a text of discourse while the more complex type 
of scheme advocated by Guarini functions as a device for evaluating an argument from analogy 
as strong or weak. The idea is that the two schemes need to be employed in tandem, with the 
simple scheme being used first and the more complex scheme being used to follow it up. This 
approach has better enabled us to bring out the significant relationships of argument from 
analogy with other closely related schemes like argument from classification and argument 
from precedent. We are now in a position to see how the basic scheme ties in with the core 
scheme, and how the core scheme fits with tools like use of factors and dimensions in case-
based reasoning.  
     By carefully distinguishing these schemes from each other, and by contrasting them with 
related schemes, we were able to get a much more precise and useful theory that shows how 
argumentation from analogy works in case-based reasoning. In particular, we have seen how 
the notion of analogy needed to be reconfigured to provide a better basis for revealing how 
arguments from precedent work, based on a premise of similarity between two cases. In typical 
cases where an argument from precedent is used, as illustrated by the examples treated, it was 
seen to be based on an underlying argument from analogy. In dealing with arguments found in 
cases, there are two general sorts of tasks to be undertaken by argumentation methods. The 
first task is that we have to recognize arguments from analogy, and to do this we need to 
distinguish between it and other closely related arguments like argument from classification 
and argument from precedent. As the case of the drug-sniffing dog showed in section 3, the 
first classification stage of reasoning by analogy leads to a later evaluation stage. The best 
device to be used for carrying out the first task is the argumentation scheme for argument from 
analogy, along with the matching critical questions and the other schemes studied in this paper.  
     It was noted in section 7 that the three-ply argumentation procedure can be used to set up 
pre and post conditions for a dialogue model of use of argument from analogy, and the other 
related types of arguments we considered, using case-based reasoning. It was shown how 
Carneades can manage schemes and critical questions, and how the formal dialogue system of 
Bex and Prakken (2010) for investigating stories provides a framework for elucidating how the 
story-based model and the argument-based model of evidence can be combined in a unified 
formal framework. A future project is to show in more detail how the argumentation scheme 
for argument from analogy should be evaluated in these systems. Another project is to apply 
the argumentation schemes and the story scheme to further cases of argument from analogy. 
Such cases could be drawn both from law and from argumentation in everyday conversational 
discourse. 
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